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The Role of Family Ties in the Labour Market. An 
Interpretation Based on Efficiency Wage Theory∗ 
 
Maria De Paola§ and Vincenzo Scoppa♦ 
 
Abstract. By casual empiricism, it seems that many firms take explicit account of the family ties 
connecting workers, often hiring individuals belonging to the same family or passing jobs on 
from parents to their children. This paper makes an attempt to explain this behaviour by 
introducing the assumption of altruism within the family and supposing that agents maximise a 
family utility function rather than an individual one. This hypothesis has been almost ignored 
in the analysis of the relationship between employers and employees. The implications of this 
assumption in the efficiency wage models are explored: by employing members of the same 
family, firms can use a (credible) harsher threat – involving all the family’s members in case of 
one member’s shirking -  that allows them to pay a lower efficiency wage. On the other hand, 
workers who accept this agreement exchange a reduction in wage with an increase in their 
probability of being employed: this can be optimal in situation of high unemployment. 
Moreover, the link between parents and children allows the firm to follow a strategy that 
solves the problem of an individual’s finite time horizon through family’s reputation. 
 
JEL classification: J41; D64; M12; Z13. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last few years the way in which economists have analysed the labour market has 
undergone a deep change deriving from an heightened awareness of its peculiarities, involving 
emotional and social factors that render it very different from other markets. Such awareness 
has given rise to a literature that has developed starting from particular hypotheses aimed at 
dealing with the complexity of the object of exchange in issue. Thus, the labour market is no 
longer identified only with productive relations, but is also seen as the stage on which a number 
of social relations, which are able to affect both workers’ performance and wages paid by firms, 
come into play (Akerlof, 1984; Lindbeck and Snower, 1988; Spagnolo,1999; Solow 1990;  
Akerlof and Yellen, 1988; 1990). The influence of social factors on economic performance has 
also been analysed in the growing literature that introduces the concept of “social capital” (see 
Putnam, 1993, Knack and Keefer, 1997, La Ferrara, 1999, among others), considered as a 
mechanism for alleviating problems of contractual enforcement and imperfect information.  
Following the same approach, this work considers the importance of social relationships 
and other non-market institutions in the working of labour markets. However, the importance of 
family is stressed. In the same manner as Becker (1981), the decisional unit considered, based 
on the hypothesis of strong altruism amongst members of the same family, is not the single 
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individual, but the family. More precisely, individuals are considered to be aiming at the 
maximising of the same family welfare function rather than of their personal utilities.  
This formulation, already applied in some theories (e.g., in the theory of consumption in 
which the decisional unit is the so-called household, or in Barro’s (1974) reformulation of 
Ricardian Equivalence Theorem using dynastic utility functions), is new in the analysis of the 
labour market, usually described as characterised by single agents moved only by their own 
needs and desires. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to assume particularly altruistic inclinations 
to admit that, usually, individuals are interested in the well-being of their relatives and that, as a 
result, they are keen to support them1.  
The hypothesis of individuals maximising a joint utility function has the same 
consequences as the assumption adopted by Becker (1974), when he considers a benevolent 
household head maximising a family welfare function that includes the utility of all family 
members, subject to a total budget constraint. Since the head of the family internalises the 
desires of his relatives, everyone behaves so to maximise the same utility function. Remarkably, 
this is true even if some family members are selfish (that is, interested only in their own utility): 
on the basis of the “Rotten Kid Theorem”, demonstrated by Becker (1974), it would not be in 
the selfish interest to undertake actions that, increasing his personal utility, reduce the total 
family well-being. It has been shown that when additional decisional variables are introduced,2 
this Theorem holds only for those utility functions that imply transferable utility (Bergstrom, 
1995).3 Under these conditions, the hypotheses of intra-family altruism solves any problem of 
incentive inside the family.4 
The idea to consider the role of family ties in the labour market was inspired by a series 
of observations concerning the hiring policies followed by a number of Italian firms in various 
industries (especially in the South of the country) and by the existence of “hereditary clauses” - 
which establish the hiring of children or spouses, together with or as a substitute for the 
employee - in a number of Collective Employment Contracts and in the labour contracts of 
some large firms. Moreover, a number of empirical researches shows that family networks are 
often used as a job search method in many labour markets. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
♦Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica, Università della Calabria. E-mail: v.scoppa@unical.it 
1 In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith wrote “Every man feels his own pleasures and 
his own pains more sensibly than those of other people. ... After himself, the members of his own family, 
those who usually live in the same house with him, his parents, his brothers and sisters are naturally the 
objects of his warmest affections: his sympathy with them is more precise and determinate, than it can be 
with the greater part of other people. It approaches, nearer, in short, to what he feels for himself”. 
2 For example, the selfish individual could have to decide the time and the level of effort to spend on 
work. 
3 That is, the cases in which the income redistribution within the family preserves the sum of the 
individual utilities. There is a large class of preferences yielding transferable utilities. An example of 
utility functions of this kind is given by the following: iii bemu −= , where mi is the money transfer made 
by the head of the family to the individual i, ei represents the effort (b>0). 
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In order to find an explanation for this evidence, we proceed to introduce into the 
efficiency wages theory intra-family altruistic behaviour that does not consist simply of money 
transfers to relatives, but also of strategies aimed at helping them in finding a job. It is shown 
that this allows firms to broaden the range of strategies available in order to obtain greater effort 
from their employees or to pay them lower wages. These strategies typically consist of the 
hiring of additional members of the same family by the firm or of the passing on of a job from 
parent to child. Generally, as we show, the workers’ acceptance of these kinds of contracts 
depends on their relatives’ state of unemployment and on the probability of their finding a job 
autonomously (and therefore on the rate of unemployment). 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 some empirical observations about the 
importance of family ties in the labour market are presented. Section 3 examines the shirking 
version of efficiency wages considering that intra-family altruism allows the firm to threaten, in 
case of shirking, a harsher punishment involving all the family’s members. Section 4 shows 
how in the same model intergenerational links and a family’s reputation can solve the problem 
of a finite individual time horizon through hereditary jobs. In the final Section some concluding 
remarks are proposed. 
 
2. Shreds of evidence about the importance of family ties in labour 
markets 
Theoretical economic papers often draw insights from anomalies, unusual behaviour or curious 
situations observed in the real world. For example, Akerlof (1984) is based on a research which 
shows that the effort provided by a group of workers exceeded significantly the firm’s requested 
minimum performance. The case of the Grameen Bank − a successful Bangladeshi bank − 
which requires borrowing agents to organise into groups of five members, coming from the 
same village, and makes them jointly liable for repayments, has been cited and examined by a 
number of economists (Varian, 1990;  Stiglitz, 1990;  Besley and Coate 1995;  Spagnolo, 1999). 
The empirical evidence on which this work is based has some common elements with these 
papers, since the particular ties linking the agents modify their economic behaviour. The 
prominent feature of the observations made here is the importance of family relationships in 
many different labour markets. 
A lot of entrepreneurs not only use to involve their own relatives in the firms they run,5 
but often they behave with their employees considering the family relationships linking them. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
4 The family behaves as the “team” considered in Marschak and Radner’s (1972) theory and the 
coordination problems typical of this formulation are solved by the orders given by the head of the family 
to his relatives. 
5 The quite widespread phenomenon of entrepreneur’s relatives employed in the same firm, even though 
it constitutes clear proof of the importance of family ties, has received little attention in our analysis 
because it represents too obvious a solution to principal-agent problem. 
 4
The firms’ decisions to hire workers belonging to the same family, to replace the retiring 
parents by recruiting their children, to use family networks to search a new worker, to assign the 
training of the entrants to their relatives previously employed by the firm, are all elements that 
constitute clear and meaningful evidence of the crucial role played by family ties in some firms’ 
hiring strategies. 
A first important evidence of the role played by family ties in the labour markets is 
provided by some “hereditary” or family related clauses included in many Italian Collective 
Employment Contracts.  These clauses explicitly establish that the child (or the spouse) of an 
employee should be hired together with the parent - or in his/her place - in case of injury, death, 
retirement, etc. Labour contracts containing such clauses are shown in Tables 1 and 2 reported 
below, which are drawn from Fabbri and Rossi (1997, p. 344-5), (in the tables the year of the 
contract is indicated, when available). 
 
Table 1. Italian Collective Employment Contracts with hereditary clauses 
Hiring of offspring (or spouse) in case of parent’s: 
 Death Retirement Together with 
Agrarian Consortia 1990   
Food processing companies 1991   
Milk Companies 1990   
Thermal Spring Companies 1990   
Marine 1991 1991  
Insurance 1991 1991  
Private Water Companies 1992 1992  
Municipal Gas and Water Companies 1991 1991  
Private Gas Companies 1991 1991  
Road maintenance and assistance 1989 1989  
Harbour Agencies * * * 
 
 
Table 2. Italian Firm Level Union Contracts with hereditary clauses 
Hiring of offspring (or spouse) in case of parent’s: 
 Death Retirement Together with 
RAI 1990 1990  
FFSS 1990   
INA 1987 1987  
Assitalia 1987 1987  
INA Assitalia 1991 1991  
Banca d'Italia 1992 1992 1992 
Consob 1993 1993 1993 
SIP 1992 1992  
Italcable 1992 1992 1992 
Ente Poste Italiane 1994   
ATC Bologna *   
Banca Popolare S. Angelo 1991   
Ist. S. Paolo Torino 1991 1991  
Banca Popolare Veneta  1992  
Banca Cattolica Popolare 1992 1992  
Credito Ind. Sardo 1992 1992  
Cassa Risparmio Cuneo  1992  
 5
Axa Assicurazioni  1993  
Source: Consiglio Nazionale dell'Economia e del Lavoro, Archivio nazionale dei contratti. 
 
Fabbri and Rossi (1997) estimated the employment covered by these contracts as equal to 
20% of the total. The importance of family ties in the Italian public sector has been detected by 
Alesina, Danninger and Rostagno (1999). 
According to the data contained in the 1999 ISTAT Labour Force Survey, informal 
networks (relatives or friends) are widely used as a job search method in the Italian labour 
market. In fact, 38% of the interviewed people obtained their first job through the help of 
relatives and friends.6 Pistaferri (1999) shows that seeking jobs through informal networks 
raises the probability of receiving job offers, but it is associated with lower earnings. Besides, 
he shows that the use of informal networks in job search activities is much higher in the South. 
Search methods based on informal networks are shown to be a widespread phenomenon also in 
U.S. (Montgomery, 1991) and in U.K. (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1994). 
Further evidence is provided in a recent paper by Bentolila and Ichino (1999, p. 16), in 
which it is argued that: “Anecdotal evidence suggests that in Spain and Italy these transfers 
[economic intergenerational transfers within extended families] do not involve only standard 
economic assets, but even jobs. Until recently, around half of all Spanish sectoral collective 
agreements included clauses by which offspring (and sometimes also relatives) of workers – 
either employed, retired, or even dead – had to be given priority in the hiring process. In Italy, 
several firm-level union contracts include clauses requiring the firm to hire the offspring of 
retiring workers. Even though this clause is not explicitly stated in contracts, firms’ personnel 
offices often implement it. This type of clauses is almost unheard of in either Germany or 
Britain, not to speak of the US”.7 
The consideration of intra-family altruism has likely influenced the choice of some banks 
to propose early retirement to their older employees in exchange for the hiring of their offspring 
or other relatives. This kind of contract was accepted in 1992 by 386 employees of Carical (a 
southern Italian bank), who decided not to wait until the maximum age for retirement, and gave 
up greater personal income in exchange for the employment of their own relatives. Similar 
policies have been adopted in recent years by the Banco di Napoli and the Banco Ambrosiano 
(involving the hiring of a hundred new employees). More recently, as reported by the Italian 
Press, the Banca di Roma has followed these personnel selection procedures, deciding to offer 
to 150 employees the possibility to retire “leaving the job as a bequest” to their children.8 
                                                          
6 See Rapporto Annuale ISTAT, Formazione e inserimento lavorativo dei giovani, Tavola 6.2. 
7 Furthermore, they report that: “The 1992 National Contract for Airport Assistants states: “When hiring, 
the employer will consider with particular favour the relatives (spouses and up to twice removed) of ex-
employees who have died or been laid off because of seniority, taking into account the titles and the 
requirements of the candidates.” (Bentolila and Ichino, 1999, p.17) 
8 “La Banca di Roma e il lavoro in eredità”, Corriere della Sera, 27/7/2000 
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The decision to replace the retiring employees with their offspring seems to be a 
somewhat widespread policy, in particular in the Southern Italian regions, where family ties 
appear to be stronger and  unemployment rates much higher (see Bentolila and Ichino, 1999). 
According to a study of a sample of Calabrian firms (De Rose and Floriani, 1999) entrepreneurs 
try to get high levels of effort and cooperation from their employees both by having friendly 
personal relations with them and by being willing to hire their relatives. Some of the 
entrepreneurs tend to represent this hiring as a consequence of a sort of pressure, while others 
are aware of the advantages deriving from these practices. 9 
Very often the preference that a firm reserves in its hiring policies for the relatives of its 
employees is not formally established in labour contracts. For example, in the insurance 
services, the agency mandate is frequently transferred from father to child. In fact, even if the 
insurance company is free to choose a completely new agent when the old one retires, usually 
the son of the previous agent is chosen.  
Given that the phenomenon has a considerable importance in various contexts, it is 
interesting to see in which way family ties can influence the relationships established between 
firms and workers. What are the effects on the incentives structure?  What is the role played by 
family ties in the contractual enforcement mechanism? Does the interference of family ties in 
the labour market facilitate its working or emphasise its problems?  Is such interference typical 
of areas with high rates of unemployment? In the following an attempt is made to answer to 
these and other questions. 
 
3. Strategies based on family ties in efficiency wage models 
In the Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984) shirking model, a worker’s opportunistic behaviour is 
prevented by the payment of a wage higher than the market-clearing level and by the threat of 
firing in case of shirking. 
In this model agents are rational, opportunists and behave considering only the effects 
of their choices on their own utility. In this Section, we remove the last assumption in order to 
take into account the existence of family ties between workers and to consider the fact that they 
seek to maximise a joint utility function. 
                                                          
9 According to one of the entrepreneurs interviewed: “To prefer, in hiring, those close to existing 
employees guarantees advantages. In that there is more urgency, a more responsible participation, a 
greater empathy because one is not working simply for money, for one's salary, but there is a more direct 
participation of the employee in the activities of the firm. The employee is more motivated, because, in 
succeeding in influencing the firm’s hiring decisions, he considers in part the firm as his own property. In 
some way, he sees the future of his family in the firm” (Interview with Paolo Vilardi in De Rose and 
Floriani, 1999). “If there are job vacancies in the firm, we try to find workers in the local labour markets, 
through our employees or through personal acquaintances. Almost 80% of hiring is realised in this way: 
among workers’ brothers, brothers-in-law, friends, etc.”, (Interview with Giovanni Mancuso in De Rose 
and Floriani, 1999). 
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It is shown that this assumption modifies the strategies followed by workers and firms 
and changes their incentive’s compatibility constraints. Under the conditions outlined below, a 
firm may find the hiring of different members of the same family beneficial since it pays them a 
lower efficiency wage and obtains higher effort thanks to the harsh threat of the firing of all the 
family members in the case of shirking by one of them. 
In this Section, a simplified formulation of the shirking model is proposed in order to 
show that - with family ties - both firms and workers are able to achieve a higher level of 
welfare compared to that attainable without this kind of agreement. 
 
3.1. The standard efficiency wage with a selfish worker 
For subsequent comparison, the efficiency wage the firm has to pay to a selfish worker is first 
determined. 
Let ewu −=  be the individual utility function, where w represents the wage received and e is 
the level of effort on the job. The choice of effort is binary: employee can provide either a level 
of effort greater than zero (e>0) or a minimal effort (e=0). It is assumed that the firm observes 
with probability p, where p<1, whether the worker behaves opportunistically. 
Let w* be the efficiency wage, r the interest rate, (1-d) the probability of finding (in the 
current period) a new job when a worker has lost his previous one. 
Using the asset equations of dynamic programming, the utility of an honest worker (uH) 
can be expressed as: 
 (3.1)  ( )
r
u
r
ewu HH +++
−=
∗
11
                ⇒             ( )
r
ewuH
−=
∗
 
In the current period the worker gets a wage w*, but he has the disutility of effort e; in the 
following period he obtains the same opportunity (the pay-off is discounted since it is assumed 
that payments are received at the end of the period). The utility of a shirking worker (uS) is 
given by: 
(3.2)  
uS = w
∗
1 + r +
1− p( )uS + p 1 − d( )uS
1 + r                        
uS = w
∗
r + dp  
In fact, in the current period he gets the wage without providing effort, but if detected, 
with probability p, he is fired and in the subsequent period he will find employment with a 
probability smaller than one, equal to (1-d). If with probability (1-p) he is not detected, he gets 
again the utility us.  
The efficiency wage which induces the worker to provide a high level of effort is 
obtained from the condition SH uu ≥ , which using (3.1) and (3.2) can be written as:  
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 (3.3)     
w∗ ≥ e 1+ r
dp
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ ⎥  
Expression (3.3) represents the non-shirking condition for a worker. If firms paid a lower 
wage, the worker would not find it convenient to work hard. 
 
3.2. The efficiency wage when the firm employs workers belonging to the same family 
It is supposed, for the sake of simplicity, that the family is composed of two workers (i and j) 
maximising a joint utility function, given by the sum of the individual utility functions (Becker, 
1996):  
(3.4)                    ji uuU +=   
Throughout this paper, capital letters denote variables referring to the family. The 
individual utility functions, ui and uj, are, as above, equal to u=w-e. 
The following strategy adopted by the firm is considered: in a given period both members 
of the same family are hired; but in the case that one of them is caught shirking, both are fired. 
In other words, being caught shirking destroys family reputation and brings negative effects on 
all the family's members. We use the hypothesis of “collective firing” in order to maintain the 
typical structure of the efficiency wage framework. However, any mechanism which provides 
incentives or sanctions based on the joint performance of all the family’s members - as 
performance related pay or promotion based on the joint output of the family - would produce 
the same effects. This kind of mechanism has the same nature as the “joint liability” strategy 
considered by Besley and  Coate (1995, p. 2): “The key feature of group lending is joint 
liability. This says that all group members are treated as being in default if any one member of 
the group does not repay his loan”.  
Under this threat, the new efficiency wage, $w , is determined, which ensures the high 
level of effort. The total family utility when its members behave honestly (UH) is: 
(3.5)  
UH = 2
ˆ w − e( )
1 + r +
UH
1+ r                            UH =
2 ˆ w − e( )
r  
As far as the opportunistic strategy is concerned, it is important to notice that since the 
sanction does not change (in any case, both workers are fired), if the shirking is convenient for 
one member, both will follow this strategy. Therefore, when the two workers shirk the family 
utility is: 
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(3.6)   
US = 2 ˆ w 1 + r +
1− p( )2US + 1− 1− p( )2[ ] 1 − d( )US
1+ r  
In this case, the probability of avoiding punishment, consisting of the joint firing, is equal 
to the joint probability that both workers are not detected, 1− p( )2 . In fact, defining the event of 
not being detected shirking for a single member as ND and considering that the probability of 
ND is equal to ( )p−1 , the family could avoid punishment only if both members are not 
detected, that is, if the event ( )NDND I  is verified. Clearly, the probability of this event is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )21 pNDPNDPNDNDP −==I . It follows that the probability of being detected and 
fired is equal to ( )[ ]211 p−− . The expression (3.6) can be simplified as: 
(3.7)    
US = 2 ˆ w r + dp 2 − p( ) 
Workers provide high effort when UH ≥ US ;  by substituting (3.6) and (3.7) the new 
level of efficiency wage (no-shirking condition) is obtained: 
(3.8)    
ˆ w ≥ e 1 + r
dp 2 − p( )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ ⎥  
By comparing (3.3) with (3.8), it is immediate that ∗< wwˆ , if p<1, condition which is 
always satisfied in a context with imperfect observability. The efficiency wage that the firm 
must pay to prevent opportunism is higher when workers do not have any family ties within the 
firm. Thus, when an appropriate sanctioning strategy is used, the firm can take advantage of the 
intra-family altruism motivating its employees, since it is able to obtain the same effort by 
paying a lower wage. In some way, the employment of the another family member constitutes a 
"bond" (defined “social collateral” by Besley and Coate, 1995) posted by workers, which raises 
the expected costs of shirking behaviour. 
 
3.3. The interest of workers in accepting “family ties” contracts 
Given the convenience for the firm, it is necessary to verify whether the implicit agreement 
based on family ties is also in the workers’ interest. It is assumed that one of the individuals is 
already employed in the firm, while the other family member is unemployed. 
The total family utility, UED, is calculated as at the beginning of period t, if workers do 
not offer themselves for a “family contract” and their relatives search for a job independently 
(behaving honestly). The employed worker’s utility will be equal to uH (equation (1.1)).  The 
lifetime utility of the unemployed family member is instead equal to: 
 10
 (3.9)           
uD = (1 − d)uH + d(uD )1+ r              ⇒                
uD = 1 + r( )1 − d( )1 + r − d( ) uH  
because (1−d) is the probability of finding a job in the current period (receiving utility 
uH), while d represents the probability of remaining unemployed. 
The total family utility is given by: DHED uuU += . Substituting (3.9) in this, the 
following expression is obtained: 
(3.10)  
UED = uH 2 − dr1+ r − d
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ =
w∗ − e
r
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 2 −
dr
1 + r − d
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥  
When the individual proposes to the firm (or accepts) a “family labour contract” with a 
consequent lower efficiency wage, $w , the utility to his family is instead equal to: 
(3.11)  
UEE = 2
ˆ w − e( )
1+ r +
UEE
1 + r          UEE =
2 ˆ w − e( )
r  
The family finds it convenient to agree to this kind of contract only when EDEE UU ≥ : 
(3.12)    
2 ˆ w − e( )
r
≥ w
∗ − e
r
2 − dr
1+ r − d
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥  
that is, if: 
(3.13)    
ˆ w − e
w∗ − e ≥ 1−
dr
2 1+ r − d( )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ ⎥      
It is evident that the wage reduction that workers are prepared to accept depends directly 
on the rate of unemployment (d): the higher unemployment is, the greater will be the acceptable 
wage reduction. In order to make this aspect clearer, by substituting (3.3) and (3.8) in the 
expressione (3.13 ), it is possible to write: 
(3.14)  
d ≥ 2 1 − p( ) 1+ r( )
r 2 − p( )+ 2 1 − p( ) =
2 1− p( ) 1+ r( )
2 1 + r( )− p 2 + r( )  
Workers accept the family ties contracts (and thus are employed in the same firm) only if 
the unemployment rate is higher than the value represented in the expression (3.14). When, on 
 11
the other hand, unemployment is low, workers’ relatives may find it convenient to look for a job 
(which pays a higher wage) independently.10 
Identical results are obtained assuming that the head of the family is the only individual 
that aims at maximising the family well-being. In fact, if he redistributes the family income 
considering a total budget constraint that includes not only the family monetary income, but also 
the effort provided by its members (and therefore carries out transfers to the family members 
taking into account the total utility of everyone rather than the monetary income which everyone 
obtains), then the type of transfers that he implements will tend to drive even selfish members 
towards the maximisation of the family welfare (Bergstrom, 1995).  In contrast, if the transfers 
by the head of the family do not take into account the effort provided on the job by family 
members, the family contract turns out to be inconvenient for the selfish individuals, because 
they could get a subsidy without working. In such a case, the family altruism would raise the 
reservation wage of these individuals leading to an increase in the duration of unemployment.11  
When labour markets are strictly regulated, the type of contracts described above are 
prevented, as firms cannot fire without just cause. The above analysis could then be applied to 
the labour market in the underground economy and in the environment of small firms. This is 
consistent with Pistaferri's findings showing that individuals hired by small firms (with less than 
five employees) are twice more likely to be hired through informal networks than otherwise 
(65% versus 35%). It is important to recall that in Italy hiring and firing regulation is not 
binding for this kind of firms. However, family ties could work even in a regulated environment 
through a more articulated threat by the firm, such as promotion refusal, stagnant wages or 
careers, and so on. Moreover, instead of the threat of "collective firing" the firm could refuse to 
hire the offspring of the retiring worker as is shown in the next Section. 
 
4. An intergenerational model of efficiency wages 
In the shirking efficiency wage models, workers opportunistic behaviour is prevented thanks to 
the threat of firing, with a consequent period of unemployment, in the case of poor performance. 
Such company’s strategy works only with an employee’s infinite time horizon. In fact, if, more 
realistically, the horizon is considered finite (because of the worker’s death or retirement), the 
                                                          
10 Expression (3.14) depends on p:  in particular, 
∂ d
∂ p < 0. If p?0, the “family labour contract” is 
convenient only if the unemployment rate is close to 1;  if p=1, the family contract is best with an 
unemployment rate close to zero.  Besides 
∂ d
∂ r < 0 : the higher the interest rate, the greater the 
convenience in agreeing to the family labour contract, even with low unemployment. 
11 However, notice that when a “family ties contract” is realised, and the selfish individual works together 
with the family head, then his/her behaviour cannot be opportunistic: the firm’s threat forces him not to 
shirk. In fact, in the case of the rotten kid shirking, the head of the family would also be fired and, 
consequently, no subsidy will be transferred. 
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so-called chain-store paradox (Selten, 1978) would block the efficacy of the proposed solution: 
in the final period T, the worker would have no interest in providing effort, since the job 
termination is already established (the firing threat has no effect).  Through backward induction, 
one readily ascertains that the incentives for the worker to provide effort disappear in all the 
periods. 
The consideration of family ties in employment decisions can offer a solution to this 
paradox. In the same vein as the policies effectively pursued by a number of banks (see above, 
Section 2), the firm can offer its employees − if they always behave honestly − the possibility of 
being replaced by one of their offspring (or by another family member) at the end of their 
careers. The importance of occupational inheritance even in the US labour markets has been 
evidenced by Laband and Lentz (1985). 
In a framework with overlapping generations, the ties between parents and children make 
it possible to implement a strategy, which may help solve the problem of the individual’s finite 
time horizon, with similar features to those introduced in Greif (1993) to explain the long 
distance trade relationships between Maghribi merchants and their foreign agents in the 
Mediterranean markets during the Eleventh Century. In the same spirit, La Ferrara (1999), 
referring to communities composed of individuals tied by family or clan relationships (defined 
as “kinships”), studies the contractual enforcement in credit relationships which is assured by 
the threat of sanctions affecting the agents’ offspring or other members of the same clan.  
To examine analytically the problem, it is supposed for simplicity that an individual’s 
time horizon is limited to a single period, after which he retires. In the following period, a new 
generation of workers appears which is dynastically linked to the former. 
In this environment, if individuals do not have offspring or they are not interested in their 
destiny (“no family ties”), comparing the honest worker’s utility with the utility deriving from 
the shirking behaviour, one obtains, on the basis of the chain store paradox, that they will decide 
to shirk at any wage level (that is, the efficiency wage tends to infinity).12 When, instead, 
individuals are interested in their offspring’s welfare and therefore in the fact that their children 
are hired to replace them in the same firm (thanks to a good “family reputation”), the individual 
utility function of generation t, which also includes the offspring utilities (discounted by factor 
δ), when they behave honestly, is equal to: 
(4.1)      ( ) 1+∗ +−= HtHt UewU δ  
                                                          
12 In a less extreme version, in which it is possible to sanction agents even during the period itself and not 
only at its end (for example, the firm could avoid paying a wage if it detects a worker’s shirking), then 
ewuH −=   and ( ) ∗−= wpuS 1 . These equations lead to a no-shirking condition equal to: 
p
ew ≥∗ . 
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Supposing that the utility functions are stationary: UHt = UHt +1 = UH , we obtain: 
(4.2)     
( )
δ−
−=
∗
1
ewU H  
Instead, if the worker shirks, he gets the following utility: 
(4. 3)   ( )[ ]111 ++∗ +−+= DtStSt pUUpwU δ  
where UDt+1 = 1− d( )USt +1 is the utility of generation t+1 of being unemployed. 
The worker who provides no effort incurs the risk that − if caught − his offspring will not 
be hired in the firm and so will have a lower expected utility because of the risk of remaining 
unemployed. 
Continuing to suppose stationary utility functions, he receives: 
 (4.4)   ( )[ ]dp
wU S −−=
∗
11 δ  
The individual interested in his offspring’s welfare will find it convenient to provide high 
effort even if the time horizon is finite when UH ≥ US , that is: 
(4.5)   ( )[ ]dp
wew
−−≥−
− ∗∗
111 δδ  
From this inequality, the efficiency wage with family ties is obtained, which is given by: 
(4.6)   ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+≥
pd
ew δ
δ11*  
Expression (4.6) shows the (finite) efficiency wage the firm must pay to obtain an honest 
behaviour from its workers through the promise of hiring their offspring.  
In this formulation δ plays a crucial role in representing the strength of the family ties. 
The above expression allows us to evaluate precisely the impact of this factor on the efficiency 
wage. When δ tends to 1, that is, if descendants utility is considered in the same way as parents’ 
utility, then w*=e: it is not necessary to pay the worker any rent exceeding the market-clearing 
wage level. In contrast, the lower the weight of offspring’s welfare in the utility functions (that 
is, the lower δ is), the higher will be the efficiency wage necessary to prevent the worker’s 
opportunism.13 
                                                          
13 Indeed, if δ tends to 0, then the efficiency wage tends to infinity. 
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The results obtained in this and in the previous section showing a lower efficiency wage 
in a family ties framework are consistent with the empirical evidence shown in Pistaferri (1999). 
Using data from the 1991 and 1993 Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth, he 
estimates a regression of earnings on a series of variables which include a dummy for whether 
the worker was hired through informal networks (which could be considered as a proxy –
admittedly imperfect – for family ties). His finding shows that this variable has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient. This effect is imputed by the author to the fact that informal 
networks are especially used by small firms. However, controlling for firm size does not remove 
the effect of informal networking on earnings. Pistaferri’s conjecture is that the residual effect is 
attributable to a correlation between low unobserved skills and the use of informal networks. An 
alternative interpretation can be offered by our analysis in which the negative effects of family 
ties on earnings depends on the firm’s use of more effective strategies and on the workers’ 
willingness to accept a lower wage in order to increase the probability of hiring of their 
relatives. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has shown how the hypothesis of individuals moved by intra-family or intra-
generational altruism, deciding on the basis of the utility obtained by their families and pursuing 
strategies aimed at helping relatives to find a job, may influence the contractual relations 
established between firms and workers. More generally, the feeling of solidarity that individuals 
develop towards their own relatives allows the implementation of new strategies that favour the 
alignment of workers’ and firms’ objectives. 
Recently some authors have shown that the social relations instituted between 
individuals –  “social capital” - can favour cooperation and improve incentives in the productive 
sphere. In this paper, in the same spirit as the approach emphasising social relations, we 
consider links that have a stronger nature, like the ones between relatives, to examine their 
influence on the labour market. Compared to the literature that emphasises the importance of 
social relations, the hypothesis of intra-family altruism permits the neglection of all the complex 
mechanisms of social sanctions necessary for the effective working of cooperation.  
This paper is an attempt to explain a quite widespread phenomenon: many firms, in 
various contexts, give importance in their personnel policies to the existing ties between 
members of the same family. Moreover empirical evidence shows that informal networks 
represent the most important job search method in many labour markets. This evidence raises 
several questions: why are different members of a family employed in the same firm? Why do 
many firms  “transmit” jobs from fathers to sons?  We provide some explanations for these facts 
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referring to the efficiency wage theory, opportunely modified to take into account intra-family 
altruism.14 
In detail, it is shown that this type of formulation, when introduced into the shirking 
version of the efficiency wage models, permits the following of a strategy of “family hiring” 
and collective laying-off in case of shirking, that allows firms to pay a lower efficiency wage, 
thanks to a less binding non-shirking condition. Within the same model, altruism towards 
offspring − as in the dynastic models − can give place to a mechanism based on hereditary jobs 
through family reputation, that solves the problem of the “chain-store paradox” under the more 
realistic hypothesis of workers’ finite time horizon. 
The kind of family ties considered in this paper tends to reduce some of the divergences 
emerging in the relationship between firms and workers. The family can be considered a non-
market institution that plays an important role in solving problems of opportunism and 
contractual enforcement in conditions of asymmetric information. 
As is shown in the paper, one of the main determinants of the adoption of family ties 
strategies is the disequilibrium situation of the labour market: workers are interested in 
suggesting and accepting implicit agreements based on “family ties” only when the 
unemployment rate is relatively high.  These aspects - together with cultural and social 
differences conditioning the strength of family ties - may very likely contribute to explaining 
the differences between the Center-North and Southern Italy in the practice of such policies.  
At a macroeconomic level, the contribution of the considered mechanisms to the re-
balancing of the labour market disequilibrium could be limited by a series of factors, than have 
received scarce attention in our analysis. The contexts in which family ties work can be 
circumscribed by the fact that often the kind of workers required by firms are not available 
within the same family (because of different training, skills, attitudes, etc.): the coincidence 
between jobs demanded by the firm and characteristics of its workers’ relatives might be 
occasional and limited. Secondly, the functioning of some of the described mechanisms – based 
for example on the laying-off of all a family members - is in conflict with the rigid employment 
protection legislation that characterises many labour markets. Moreover, the workers’ interest in 
joining the examined contractual agreements might be remarkably weakened by evaluations 
regarding the excessive concentration of risk in case of idiosyncratic shocks hitting the firm in 
which the family works.  
In the paper only the positive effects of family ties have been stressed. A series of 
drawbacks should also be considered. First of all, when effective, family ties mechanisms can 
generate perverse redistribution, marginalisation and problems of fairness. In fact, the existence 
of preferential channels in hiring determines a polarisation in families employment: it allows the 
relatives of individuals already employed to find a job with greater facility, while it increases 
                                                          
14 In our work the widespread phenomenon of entrepreneurs’ relatives employed in the same firm and the 
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the difficulties in finding a job for families whose members are all unemployed. Secondly, 
family ties can lead to increasing strongly the incentive of workers to collude to the damage of 
firm. Finally, if the altruism between the family members is not perfectly symmetrical, the 
transfers carried out in favour of the unemployed members of the family could increase their 
reservation wages and, consequently, determine an increase in the duration of unemployment. 
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